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CASE NOTES
affect a political campaign should not be subsidized."'" The Su-
preme Court has yet to attach constitutional weight to this interest.
And it has yet to determine what level of invidiousness is reached by
tax classifications which infringe on fundamental rights. Until it
does so, the First Amendment claims raised in Americans United
remain novel and troubling, and it would seem that sufficiently
substantial constitutional question exists to justify an exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act.
Nonetheless, the Sdpreme Court's unwillingness to depart from
the rigid and clumsy test enunciated in Enochs leaves tax-exempt
organizations virtually without a remedy in the face of potentially
arbitrary infringements of their First Amendment rights. Given
Enochs' virtual foreclosure of access to a precollection remedy even
where basic liberties are threatened with destruction, it is submitted
that the Anti-Injunction Act should have been interpreted as permit-
ting injunctive relief where a substantial constitutional question
involving fundamental rights is coupled with a showing of irrepara-
ble injury.
RICHARD J. SHEA
Trade Secrets—Federal Patent Law Preemption of State Trade
Secret Law—Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 1 —Harshaw Chem-
ical, a subsidiary of plaintiff, Kewanee Oil Co., completed a sixteen
year research program which produced the first seventeen-inch
sodium iodide thallium crystal ever manufactured in the United
States. 2 The crystal is used for the detection of ionizing radiation.
The manufacture of the seventeen-inch crystal represented a
significant advancement in the field. 3 Three years after the produc-
tion of the first seventeen-inch crystal, Bicron Corporation, the
defendant, was formed by three former Harshaw employees, all of
whom had been involved in the research program. Within nine
months, Bicron had produced its first seventeen-inch crysta1. 4 The
183 Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854 (10th Cir.
1972) (emphasis deleted).
' 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (5-3 majority).
2 Id. at 473. While Harshaw was not alone in its interest in growing sodium iodide
thalium crystals, no other research team had been able to grow a 17-inch crystal. See Brief for
Petitioner at 5-6, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), reprinted in 7 Trade
Reg. Law Reprints (no. 3a) 43 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Law Reprints]; Brief for Respondent
at 5-6, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), reprinted in Law Reprints,
supra, at 121.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 107.4, 1076 (6th Cir. 1973).
416 U.S. at 473.
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plaintiffs claimed that Bicron and the individual defendants had
appropriated 40 trade secrets. Both the federal district court and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that
twenty of the forty trade secrets allegedly appropriated by the de-
fendants were protected by Ohio trade secret law.' However, the
Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision to grant a perma-
nent injunction against the use or disclosure of those secrets 6 and
held Ohio's trade secret law unconstitutional as applied to those
secret processes which were appropriate subjects of protection under
the standards set out by section 101 of the United States Patent
Code,' but were excluded from such protection by the public use of
the discoveries for over one year. 8 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and noted a conflict among the circuits over the applicabil-
ity of the doctrine of preemption. 9 HELD: Neither the patent clause
of the Constitution nor patent laws enacted by Congress prevent the
enforcement of state laws protecting trade secrets.I 8
5 478 F.2d at 1076-77, The record of the district court proceeding was ordered sealed in
order to prevent the disclosure of Kewanee's secrets. The decision is unreported.
6 Id. at 1086. See Brief for Petitioner at 4, reprinted in Law Reprints, supra note 2, at
43.
7
 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). This section provides: "Inventions patentable: Whoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title."
6
 478 F,2d at 1086. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970) provides in part: "Conditions for patenta-
bility; novelty and loss of right to patent: A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... (b)
the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or in a foreign country
or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States . . ..."
9
 414 U,S. 818 (1973). There is some doubt as to whether a conflict actually exists. It
appears that no other federal court has decided the precise question confronted by the Sixth
Circuit: whether trade secret protection of patentable discoveries (within the meaning of
§ 101) in the form of enforcement of employee secrecy obligations is consistent with federal
law. The great majority of the cases decided by the other circuits which found no preemption
involved unpatentable secrets or secrets easily discoverable on marketing of the product. See,
e.g., Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971); Dekar Indus., Inc. v.
Bissett-Berman Corp,, 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971);
Water Serv., Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969); Winston Research
Corp. v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965); Servo Corp. of
America v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), rehearing denied, 342 F.2d 993
(1965), cert, denied, 383 U.S. 934, rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 914 (1966). Thus, they involve
less serious conflicts with patent policy, and therefore would present a much weaker case for
the need to preempt state trade secret laws.
When state laws act to impede the achievement of policy goals inherent in federal laws
legitimately enacted by Congress, the doctrine of preemption requires that the state laws must
be struck down. As the Court said in Hines v, Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), "Our primary
function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, ... [state]
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. . ." 312 U.S. at 67.
'° 416 U.S. at 491. At least three of the eight justices sitting on the Kewanee case (Justice
Powell did not take part) disagreed with the majority's contention that the conflict between
patent law and trade secret protection was not sufficiently substantial to require preemption.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall contended that conflict was substantial, but that
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Ohio's trade secret law, like that adopted by most states
through the common law doctrine of unfair competition, protects
developers of new techniques or other useful information from cer-
tain types of discoveries or disclosures of. that information." Thus,
trade secret law creates a quasi-property right to secrecy of
discoveriesu and discourages certain types of competition deemed
contrary to the public interest. Not only does state trade secret law
protect the holder from improper discoveries through industrial
espionage," but it also allows the holder to exploit those secrets
commercially by enforcing implied or express contracts with em-
ployees not to disclose secrets revealed in confidence." This permits
the holder to use the secret process without creating a danger of loss
of the secret.
As compared with the protection afforded by state trade secret
law, federal patent protection is less readily available, but more
pervasive in scope. Enacted pursuant to the Article I, section 8
mandate "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . ,"" the
patent laws reward and encourage invention by granting the appli-
cant a seventeen-year monopoly on the invention, thereby excluding
all others from any use whatsoever, even if arrived at by indepen-
dent discovery." However, the patent laws greatly restrict the
circumstances in which patent protection is available. The discovery
must amount to a "new and useful process, machine, or composition
of matter"" constituting a significant advancement in the field
which is not "obvious at the time the invention was made to a
Congress had evidenced a specific intent not to preempt trade secret protection. 416 U.S. at
494 (concurring opinion). Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented, contending that the
conflict was so substantial that trade secret protection in the form of an injunction against the
use of any discovery was completely preempted. 416 U.S. at 499 (dissenting opinion).
" 416 U.S. at 475. Ohio defines trade secrets along the lines of 4 Restatement of Torts
§ 757, comment b (1939):
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's own business, and which gives him an opportu-
nity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating, or preserv-
ing materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 498, 192 N.E.2d 99, t04 (1963);
accord, W.R. Grace & Co. v, Hargadine, 392 F.2d 9, 14 (6th Cir. 1968).
" See DuPont Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917) (Holmes, J.). Considering
the exclusionary rights of the holder and his ability to dispose of it in licensing contracts, the
trade secret bears many of the essential characteristics of property.
15
 While trade secret law is for the most part a product of the common law development
of the doctrine of unfair competition, industrial espionage law is often statutory. See Note,
Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection Meeting Judicial Standards of Patentability, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 807, 826 (1974).
14 Curry v. Marquart, 133 Ohio St. 77, 79, 11 N.E.2d 868, 869 (1937).
15 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16 416 U.S. at 490.
11
 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
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person having ordinary skill in the art."" The class of innovations
which are sufficiently new, useful and nonobvious to qualify for
protection under the rigid standards of the patent laws would ap-
pear to be quite restricted. Thus, there exists a wide body of
information which is valuable and unknown enough to constitute a
trade secret, yet insufficiently new, useful and nonobvious to meet
the rigorous standards of sections 101 and 103 of the federal patent
laws. 19
Federal patent law also sets out a number of limitations on the
patentability of those inventions which meet the standards of inven-
tion and obviousness. These limitations relate to the circumstances
of invention. 20
 The applicant loses his right to a patent if he has
dedicated the invention to a public use for more than one year prior
to the patent application. The policy behind that provision is clear.
The inventor should not be allowed to delay his application until
there is a danger of invention by someone else, since that would
permit an extension of the monopoly significantly past the
seventeen-year statutory limit. 21
 In Kewanee, both the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court found that the appropriated trade
secrets were clearly patentable within the guidelines of sections 101
and 103, but were ineligible for patent protection under the one year
of public use exception. 22
The public use exception demonstrates one significant underly-
ing objective of both patent policy and federal commerce policy
—the maximization of free competition. While invention can be
encouraged through the granting of monopolies, those monopolies
must be limited in scope and in duration. The patent laws restrict
the protection afforded to that absolutely necessary to stimulate
inventive endeavors. The patentee must completely disclose all dis-
1 " 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970) states:
Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter: A patent may not be
obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in
section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by
the manner in which the invention was made.
19 416 U.S. at 482.
2° See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
21
 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829); Atlas v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 311 F.2d
156, 159 (1st Cir. 1962); Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Kent Indus., 274 F. Supp. 993,
997 (E.D. Mich. 1967). Section 102(b) has been interpreted as requiring that the inventor
choose whether to rely on trade secret or patent protection. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.,
442 F.2d 216, 224 (2d Cir. 1971). Section 102(b) could be viewed as a congressional determi-
nation that one year of public use amounts to a dedication to the public and an abandonment
of all property rights in the invention. Such an interpretation would have allowed disposition
of Kewanee without consideration of the issue of preemption, on the grounds that Ohio's trade
secret law had mistakenly been applied to non-secrets. Neither the Supreme Court nor the
lower courts adopted this interpretation, since it would have constituted a preemption of all
trade secret protection lasting over one year.
22
 416 U.S. at 474; 478 F.2d at 1078.
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coveries sought to be patented by providing specifications for his
invention in the patent application. The Patent Office follows a
policy of requiring applications to be drawn with extreme
specificity. All facets of the invention not within the narrow statu-
tory guidelines of novelty and nonobviousness must be excluded
from the patent and left unprotected. 23 Federal courts are even
more strict in minimizing effects of patent grants on free
competition. 24 Infringement is very rarely found, and a large per-
centage of all patent grants appealed are overturned. 25 Finally, the
Supreme Court has constantly expanded the grounds on which a
patent can be challenged and enlarged the class of potential challen-
gers by striking down doctrines such as licensee estoppel. 26
The statutory requirement that all aspects of the inventions
patented must be carefully described and completely disclosed is
designed to facilitate copying at the termination of the seventeen-
year period. 27 In a long line of cases the Court has struck down any
attempt to extend protection past that termination date, although
that protection may be derived from state unfair competition law. 28
In addition to facilitating copying at the expiration of the pat-
ent, disclosure works to minimize anti-competitive effects in another
manner. While the patent protects the patentee from direct copying
of his discoveries by competitors, it does not prevent others from
utilizing the unpatented, underlying principles of the invention and
applying those principles to other fields. This "cross-fertilization"
process is an important element of the effort of the patent laws to
maximize scientific advancement while still protecting inventors
from the type of copying which would leave their original efforts
unrewarded."
While the aims of patent and trade secret Iaw are generally
complementary and not contradictory, insofar as they are both de-
signed to encourage invention, the areas of conflict between patent
policy and trade secret law may be quite significant in some
instances,30 as Kewanee demonstrates. Adopting the trichotomy ar-
23 See Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), for an example of the rigor of Patent Office
standards. There, the applicant required six years and a number of redrawings of his
application to narrow it sufficiently to satisfy the Office. Id. at 658. See also 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1970).
24 See Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
25 Note, supra note 13, at 823.
2h See Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969). Lear overruled Automatic Radio Mfg.
Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950). Previous to Lear the licensee of patent
rights had been estopped from claiming the invalidity of the patent as a defense to non-
payment of royalties.
Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust
Supremacy, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1432, 1441 (1967).
Scott Paper v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945); Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938).
29 Doerfer, supra note 27, at 1441.
" 416 U.S. at 474.
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ticulated by Judge Friendly in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.," the
Court examined the interaction of the two systems of law as applied
to the categories of: (1) clearly patentable trade secrets, (2) question-
ably patentable trade secrets, and (3) clearly unpatentable trade
secrets. 32
 It is in the first category in which Kewanee's secrets fall,
and it is in that category that the most substantial conflicts between
the two bodies of law occur. 33
31
 442 F.2d 216, 224 (2d Cir. 1971).
32
 416 U.S. at 474. "Patentable" within the meaning of Kewanee and Painton is defined
as sufficient to meet the standards of §§ 101 and 103. The Court indicated that protection of
unpatentable secrets should not be preempted because of the minimal effect of such protection
on patent law. Although it could be argued that Congress, in setting up the standards of
§ 103, implicitly denied protection to all obvious discoveries and preempted trade secret protec-
tion of such discoveries, the Court rejected such arguments, mainly relying on Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 416 U.S. at 483.
Goldstein would seem to be controlling as to matters not falling within § 101, but eligible
for trade secret protection (e.g., customer lists, corporate organization). Such secrets, like the
sound recordings in Goldstein, are in an area which Congress, by its silence, seems to have
left to the states by its manifestation of a desire not to regulate.
As to secrets falling within § 101, but not meeting § 103 standards of non-obviousness,
Goldstein seems less relevant. Section 103 can be read as an expression of an intent not to
protect obvious advancements in any way because such advancements should not be encour-
aged and deserve no protection. Supporting that interpretation is the dictum in Goldstein that
the patent laws, in striking a careful balance between invention and free competition in-
terests, imply that certain advancements should be afforded no protection whatsoever,
whether by patent law or by state law. 412 U.S. at 569.
As to category (2), questionably patentable inventions, the Kewanee Court reasoned that
trade secret protection would not deter the inventor from seeking a patent because of the clear
superiority of patent protection in terms of duration and breadth. 416 U.S. at 487. Whether
that appraisal of the relative protections is accurate will greatly depend on the nature of the
invention. If it arguably does not meet the standard of non-obviousness, the potential for
monopoly through trade secret protection is minimal since independent discovery within a
short time is likely. If, on the other hand, the invention meets the section 101 standard of
invention and the section 103 standard of non-obviousness, yet is still questionably patentable
because it arguably falls into one of the technical exceptions embodied in section 102,
monopoly by secrecy seems a real possibility.
Furthermore, the public interest in dissemination of non-obvious, inventive ideas, an
interest embodied in the patent laws and their disclosure requirement, would indicate that
inventions fitting the standards of sections 101 and 103 should be either patented or left
unprotected. That interest is far less substantial when discoveries obvious to the industry in
general are involved. As to inventions not clearly meeting the standards of sections 101 and
103, Congress seems to have left some regulation available to the states by its silence. But see
Wydick, Trade Secrets: Federal Preemption in Light of Goldstein and Kewanee, 56 J. Pat.
Off. Soc'y 4 {1974).
33
 There is little doubt that the Constitution leaves some room for state regulation of
intellectual "property" in the form of trade secret protection. In Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546
(1973), where a statute punishing the piracy or re-recording of sound recordings was chal-
lenged, the Supreme Court recognized that the powers enumerated in the Patent and
Copyright Clause are clearly non-exclusive: while states may be precluded from regulating
subject matter which by its nature does not allow a diversity of treatment, id. at 553, trade
secret law, like copyright regulation of recordings, is not such an area. Id. at 558-59. Matters
of peculiarly local concern in which diversity of regulatory standards has a minimal effect on
commercial intercourse fall within the concurrent powers of state and federal governments.
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 318 (1851). In point of fact, trade secret
protection is rather uniform. At any rate, it is difficult to imagine how non-conformity could
really have any prejudicial or detrimental effects.
296
CASE NOTES
The court of appeals in Kewanee found Ohio's trade secret law
unconstitutional not because of any inherent conflict between that
body of law and the Patent Clause, but because of conflict with the
patent laws enacted by Congress in pursuit of its constitutional
power. 34 In order to obtain the seventeen-year monopoly which
accompanies a patent, the inventor must completely forego secrecy
and reveal all specifications to the public. 35
 Disclosure is the quid
pro quo of the grant of the patent monopoly. The public benefit of
disclosure of the invention during as well as after expiration of the
seventeen-year period, justifies this monopoly as an exception to the
federal policy of free competition in ideas."
However, in refusing to find preemption of trade secret protec-
tion of patentable discoveries, the Supreme Court and other federal
courts have recognized that the federal policy favoring disclosure is
not absolute. 37
 Several prior Supreme Court decisions have indi-
cated that patent law affords the inventor two alternatives: (1)
maintain secrecy and attempt to prevent copying of the invention
under the protection of state trade secret law; or (2) disclose the
discoveries and obtain a statutory monopoly of seventeen years on
the invention." Trade secret protection aids the inventor in his
choice of the first alternative by allowing him to disclose the secret
to a few persons in a confidential (employees) or contractual (licens-
ees) relationship with him. It permits commercial exploitation of the
discovery without the creation of a danger of disclosure and copying
by competitors.
The encouragement of the secrecy alternative embodied in state
trade secret law may prove detrimental to the public policy objec-
tives set out by patent law. Generally, the choice of trade secret
protection will bar the process of cross-fertilization encouraged by
34 478 F.2d at 1086.
35 35 U.S.C.	 154 (1970). See, Doerfer, supra note 27, at 1440-41.
38
 Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944); United States v, Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933). At least one view of the disclosure policy of
patent law is that it is a reflection of the general federal antitrust policy embodied in the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 11§ 1 et seq. (1970), That interpretation has led one
commentator to view those Supreme Court cases finding preemption of state law by patent
law as essentially antitrust cases. See Adelman, An Antitrust Decision: Lear v. Adkins, 16
Wayne L. Rev. 77 (1969); Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Preemption: The Aftermath of
Sears and Compco, 49 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 713 (1967).
In their recognition of patent law as drawing a balance between public interests in
competition and research and development, Adelman's theories have a great deal of merit.
Procompetitive policies do not arise only out of the Sherman Act. Those policies are inherent
in the Patent Code itself. For an expression of patent policy favoring competition predating
the Sherman Act, see Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322 (1858).
37
 Doerfer, supra note 27, at 1444. See also cases cited in note 9 supra.
38
 See Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944); United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186, 187 (1933); Hecher v. Contoure Laboratories,
279 U.S. 388, 391 (1929); DuPont Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U,S, 100, 102 (1917); Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 402-03 (1911); Board of Trade
v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250-51 (1905).
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the patent system's disclosure requirement. 39 While protection of
secrecy may encourage invention of the particular device involved
by giving the inventor the economic advantage of a "headstart," 4° it
will discourage advances in parallel fields by preventing the "ex-
perimentation by analogy" fostered by federal patent disclosure.'"
Furthermore, there is some danger that encouragement of the
secrecy alternative will upset the balance between the promotion of
invention and the preservation of competition, which is the aim of
the seventeen-year limit on patent monopoly protection. While a
number of secrets can be discovered through reverse engineering in
a matter of months or years, there exists the possibility that the
subject matter will be of a nature that it reveals nothing relative to
its production methods, even after appearance on the open
market. 42 Since the injunctive relief granted by the district court
carried no termination date, Bicron could make use of the technol-
ogy necessary to grow seventeen-inch crystals only when that tech-
nology became public knowledge. Whether that date would come in
thirty days or thirty years could be merely a matter of speculation. 43
Thus, trade secret protection may aid the inventor in perpetuating a
monopoly longer than under patent protection. For that reason the
court of appeals found the need to apply the doctrine of preemption
in Kewanee."
Although the possibility of a perpetual monopoly is inherent in
the unassailable right of an inventor to keep the invention secret,
only trade secret protection can make that alternative profitable to
the inventor. Without it, the inventor usually could maintain se-
crecy only at a prohibitive expense, since he would be required to
pay exhorbitant salaries in order to maintain employee loyalty,
unless he was able to market the invention unaided by employees.
Only rarely could the holder of the undiscoverable trade secret be
able to withhold public knowledge of his methods without the
39 Doerfer, supra note 27, at 1441.
40
 The headstart afforded by trade secret law is essentially the period required by
competitors to discover the secret through reverse engineering once the product is placed on
the market. Without trade secret protection, the secret would be immediately subject to
discovery by competitors. With trade secret protection, the holder enjoys the advantage of
being the sole marketer of a product between the time of marketing and the time of discovery
through reverse engineering.
41 Doerfer, supra note 27, at 1441.
42 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 497 n.2. The Court recognized the
possible effects of trade secrecy relative to inventions that could be placed on the market
without revealing those secrets in Kendall v. Winsor, 67, U.S. (21 How.) 322, 329, 330 (1858).
43 Citing a number of scientific authorities for the principle that inventions are usually
the product of multiple independent discoveries, Chief Justice Burger contended that only in
very rare circumstances would a discovery not be duplicated within a very short time by
independent development. 416 U.S. at 490. Such an assumption is of questionable validity,
both scientifically and legally. It is certainly not reliable enough to preclude the possibility that
some inventors might be able to maintain a monopoly of over seventeen years through
reliance on trade secret protection.
" 478 F.2d at 1086.
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enforcement of confidential or contractual secrecy. Trade secrecy
protection adds to the right of secrecy the right to exploit the
invention without the public disclosure required to obtain a patent.
The majority of the Supreme Court in Kewanee recognized the
effects of trade secret protection on the disclosure objective inherent
in patent law: "If a State, through a system of protection, were to
cause a substantial risk that holders of patentable inventions would
not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state protection, we
would be compelled to hold that such a system could not constitu-
tionally continue to exist." 45 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Berger re-
jected preemption on the grounds that there is "no reasonable risk of
deterrence from patent application by those who can reasonably
expect to be granted patents . . . ."46 He reasoned that patent
protection was so superior to trade secret protection that few inven-
tors would choose the latter. 47
Justice Marshall's concurring opinion points out the weaknesses
inherent in the majority's determination that deterrence from a
patent application was not a likely consequence of the existence of
trade secret protection. "State trade secret law provides substantial
protection to the inventor who intends to use or sell the invention
himself rather than license it to others, protection which in its
unlimited duration is clearly superior to the 17-year monopoly af-
forded by the patent laws."'" For those inventions which do not
reveal the underlying trade secrets upon appearance on the market,
the possibility of reliance upon state trade secret law rather than
federal patent protection is substantial. In Kewanee, the appearance
of the seventeen-inch crystal on the market did nothing to aid other
companies or researchers in their so-far fruitless efforts. Thus, it
seems unlikely that competitors would have discovered indepen-
dently Kewanee's secrets either within the few years which Chief
Justice Burger predicted49 or within the seventeen-year patent
period during which economic protection for the inventor would be
assured and disclosure of the secrets compelled. Since Kewanee
abandoned a pending patent application during the course of litiga-
tion against Bicron, 5 ° it apparently expected a long period of
monopoly-by-secrecy.
The possibility of protection beyond the seventeen-year patent
period may not be the sole reason for an inventor's decision to rely
upon trade secret protection rather than to seek a patent. Since the
patent applicant requires significant legal and technical aid, the
patent system is quite expensive. Thus, the inventor may forego a
45 416 U.S. at 489.
46 Id.
47
 Id. at 490.
41 Id. at 494 (concurring opinion).
49 See note 43 supra.
5 ° Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Certiorari at 8, n.10, reprinted in 7 Trade Reg.
Law Reprints (no. 3a) 19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Law Reprints).
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patent application and rely on the headstart presented to him by
secrecy protection. By immediately initiating production and hoping
that the process of reverse engineering takes at least a few years, the
inventor may monopolize that market for a few years and then
exploit the advantage arising from being first on the market."
Without trade secret protection, such a headstart is likely to be so
brief that a patent will be sought. Thus, trade secret protection may
be sufficient in duration to provide economic benefits substantial
enough to deter patent application.
The majority also reasoned that the scope of trade secret pro-
tection is so narrow in comparison with that of patent protection
that reliance on it by a holder of patentable secrets is extremely
unlikely. 52
 While a patent bars competition in the product or
method patented, according to the Kewanee majority trade secret
protection of the sort found in Kewanee takes the form of a single
injunction against competition by a single company. That injunction
merely resulted from wrongful breaches of confidence by Kewanee
employees. However, the real protection afforded Kewanee, or any
other holder of a patentable trade secret which can be placed in
public use without being disclosed, is not merely an injunction
against one competitor. The availability of injunctive relief under
state trade secret law operates as a prohibition against all com-
petitors from use of the only available means of competition—the
offer of greater salaries to the holder's employees to induce disclo-
sure. Allowing such competition, which might be illegal under state
law, serves the interest in free competition reflected by the federal
Patent Code's policies of disclosure and monopoly of limited dura-
tion.
The concept that pro-competitive patent policy may require
states to permit some forms of competition generally deemed socially
undesirable is not completely foreign to the Supreme Court. In Lear
51
 The loss of that headstart value was a key reason for industry uproar in the wake of
the court of appeals decision in Kewanee. The Sixth Circuit's finding evoked an apparent
outbreak of concern by business interests throughout the nation. Amicus Curiae briefs urging
reversal were filed by the American Bar Association, the Bar Association of the District of
Columbia, the Ohio State Bar Association, the American Patent Law Association, the New
York Patent Law Association, the American Chemical Society, the Manufacturing Chemists
Association, the Association for the Advancement of Invention and Innovation, the Licensing
Executive Society, the Electronic Industries Association, and the Chamber of Commerce. See
Law Reprints, supra note 50, passim. Most predicted disastrous economic effects from
preemption of trade secret protection. One group estimated economic losses of over $1 billion
should the Supreme Court affirm the Sixth Circuit's Kewanee decision. Brief for Licensing
Executives Society as Amicus Curiae at 91-92, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470 (1974), reprinted in Law Reprints (no. 3a), supra note 50, at 123. See note 2 supra.
One amicus brief, filed by the National Patent Council, Inc. and the National Small
Business Association, Inc., urged that the Court affirm the Sixth Circuit. Reprinted in Law
Reprints (no. 3b), supra note 50, at 1.
52
 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974). "Where patent law acts
as a barrier, trade secret law functions relatively as a sieve." Id.
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v. Adkins," the Court struck down a principle of state contract law
aimed at preventing irresponsible commercial behavior because of
the conflict between that principle and anti-monopolistic patent
policy. 54
 The principle that a contracting party cannot deny the
value of what he has contracted for when seeking recission 55 was
rejected as the Court overruled the long-standing doctrine of li-
censee estoppel. 56
 The Court held that a licensee of patent rights
would no longer be estopped from claiming the invalidity of the
patent. 57
 The federal policy of encouraging competition by limiting
patent grants to those absolutely necessary to promote development
was viewed as requiring an exception to state doctrine of contract
estoppel in order to maximize the number of potential challengers to
any patent." In both Lear and Kewanee state laws prevented a
single competitor from using a discovery not protected by a valid'
patent because of the manner in which that competitor obtained the
use of the discovery. Thus, Lear indicates that the federal policy
favoring free 'competition which underlies the patent laws should
override state law prohibiting certain forms of competition, even
when that competition comes from a single source.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffe1, 59
 and its companion case,
53 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
54
 Id. at 671.
55
 Id. at 656.
56
 Id, at 671. The doctrine of licensee estoppel had been gradually eroded since its
formulation, Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
See Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 257, 258 {1945) (allowing licensor to
argue that the patent had expired); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation
Co., 266 U.S. 342, 353 (1924) (allowing licensor or assignor to narrow the scope of the patent
grant).
57
 Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. at 671.
51' Id. at 670. The Lear Court was also indirectly faced with the issue of trade secret
protection and its conflict with patent policy. Lear sought to avoid the payment of royalties on
the grounds that the possible failure of Adkins' patent would release them from any contrac-
tual obligations. Adkins argued that his release of trade secrets would provide sufficient
consideration for the licensing contract. Stating that no royalties could be required after the
patent grant because that grant terminated secrecy, the majority sidestepped the issue by
remanding to the state court for consideration of the question of the enforceability of royalties
requirements in the pre-patent period. Id. at 675. This would imply that a patent application
will terminate any agreement under which royalties are paid for the right to utilize trade
secrets. Whether the agreement should be enforceable at all if the secret had not been
patented was left unresolved by the Lear majority,
Three dissenting justices (Black, Douglas, and Warren) would have made any enforce-
ment of royalties dependent on the patentability decision, "[P]rivate arrangements under
which self-styled 'inventors' do not keep their discoveries secret but rather disclose them, in
return for contractual payments, run counter to the plan of our patent laws . ." Id. at 677
(dissenting opinion). At least those three justices seemed willing to apply the doctrine of
preemption of trade secret protection by refusing to enforce licensing agreements. One
interpretation of Lear is that the contract required patentability and not that a contract
providing for the licensing of trade secrets would be unenforceable. Congressional and
industry reaction to Lear indicates a rejection of that interpretation.
59 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.," the Court also struck
down state unfair competition law because of its conflict with fed-
eral patent policy. 6 ' There, the conflict was more direct than in
Kewanee since the injunction granted under state law effectively.
precluded all competitors from copying the design of the articles
involved. The defendants had been permanently enjoined from
copying the design of certain articles because of possible consumer
confusion as to the identity of the manufacturer. Although the
plaintiffs did not possess a valid design patent, the lower court had
issued an injunction which effectively gave the original manufac-
turer a patent-type monopoly on sales of the item. 62 The rationale of
the Sears decision was that state law regulating the use of ideas or
products not protected by a valid patent conflict with the patent
policy that a limited statutory monopoly should act as the sole
exception to the general policy favoring free competition in ideas.
On its face, the protection provided by state unfair competition
law in Sears and Compco was broader and more similar to a patent
than that provided by Ohio's trade secret law in Kewanee. Bicron
was not enjoined from producing a seventeen-inch crystal, but
merely from using Kewanee's secrets in doing so. 63
 The majority in
Kewanee found that distinction compelling, and refused to apply the
doctrine of preemption in Kewanee, notwithstanding its application
in Sears and Compco."
Despite that apparent distinction, the practical difference be-
tween the anti-competitive effects of the Sears or Compco injunction
and the Kewanee injunction is minimal. In all three cases, a state's
interest in preventing forms of competition deemed contrary to
public policy was used to justify the grant of an effective monopoly
over a product. The monopoly in Sears was a result of a judicial
decree that a certain design could not be copied; the monopoly in
Kewanee was the product of a decree that the only realistically
available means of copying, that is, use of trade secrets acquired
through Kewanee employees, was closed to any competitor until
Kewanee chose to reopen it. The major difference between the two
cases is that the alleged secret in Sears was revealed by marketing
while it was not in Kewanee. In Kewanee, trade secret protection
was sufficient to provide a monopoly on production while in Sears
additional protection had to be sought because the invention lost its
secrecy once placed in commercial use. In each case, the type of.
discovery for which patent protection is normally available 65 was so
well-protected by state law that the inventor did not need to submit
6° 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
61 376 U.S. at 231; 376 U.S. at 236-37.
63 Id.
63
 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1077 (6th Cir. 1973).
64
 416 U.S. at 482-83,
65
 That is, an invention satisfying	 101; see note 7 supra.
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to the rigors and public safeguards of the patent system in order to
protect his exploitation of the invention."
Lear, Sears, Compco, and a number of earlier cases finding
preemption of state unfair competition law 67 seem to point to a
consistent interpretation of patent law. These cases indicate that any
limitation of free competition in technology must fall within the
careful balance set out by the standards adopted by the Patent
Office. However, the Kewanee Court noted that each of these cases
involved free competition in ideas "in the public domain" and
reasoned that they should not be read as prohibiting secrecy al-
together or precluding an inventor's decision not to place his ideas
"in the public domain."" Nonetheless, it would appear that where
the protection of state law permits commercial exploitation with
little danger of a loss of secrecy, as in the Kewanee situation, the
disincentive to seek a patent seems so great that every avenue of
competition should be left open. Sears and Lear indicated that
federal interest in free competition can override any state interest in
prohibiting unfair competition, even where the unfair competition is
in the form of the inducement to a breach of a contractual or
fiduciary duty. 69 As Justice Stone stated in Scott Paper Co. V.
66 The fact that the inventors in Sears and Compco sought to obtain patents is not
significant. The key question is whether state law provides the inventor protection not
authorized by the patent laws.
67 E.g., Scott Paper v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945); Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
a* 416 U.S. at 484. The distinction made by the Kewanee majority between unpatented
information placed in the public domain and infOrmation not in the public domain seems
grounded on the notion that the patent laws should not be interpreted a .4 absolutely requiring
disclosure of all secret information. Indeed, it is clear that the Court has always been
unwilling to prohibit an inventor's decision to merely keep his invention secret if he so desires.
At the same time, it is also clear that the inventor's right to secrecy should not extend to a
right to protected secrecy once he has placed the invention in public use and has begun
commercial exploitation of the product of his discoveries. Once the invention is placed on the
market, the public's interest in competition in the invention would seem to take precedence
over the right to protection of secrecy. The real distinction insofar as the patent policy of
disclosure is concerned is between invention in and out of public use and not between
inventions in and out of the public domain.
69 376 U.S. at 231; 395 U.S. at 670-71. Whether patent law prevents a state from
prohibiting industrial espionage is another matter. Where the discovery of trade secrets comes
through an invasion of privacy, a trespass, or some other tort, the state's interest goes beyond
a mere desire to regulate competition. Furthermore, protection against industrial espionage is
consistent with the recognition that a trade secret holder has a right to completely preserve
secrecy by keeping the product off the market. Since the real conflict between state trade
secrecy protection and patent law arises from the influence of the state protection in allowing
commercial exploitation of secrets, industrial espionage law can stand consistently with patent
law,
On the other hand, the preemption of state enforcement of secrecy covenants should not
be restricted to mere prohibition of state court injunctive relief, as Justice Douglas's dissent
appears to imply. 416 U.S. at 499 (dissenting opinion). Assessing damages for such a breach
would most likely have the same prohibitive effect on competition in employees that injunc-
tive relief would have.
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Marcalus Manufacturing Co.: 7° "The interest in private good faith is
not a universal touchstone which can be made the means of
sacrificing a public interest secured by an appropriate exercise of the
legislative power."'" At least in the narrow category of patentable
trade secrets undiscoverable upon marketing, the conflicts between
patent law and trade secret protection seem substantial." The dis-
tinctions found between the level of conflict between state and
federal law in Sears and Lear and the level in Kewanee seem
inadequate to support the Court's determination that preemption •
was required in the former cases but not in the latter. Thus, it is
submitted that the body of preemption law developed in Sears and
Lear required preemption of state trade law protecting patentable
discoveries in Kewanee.
A possible reason for the Court's rejection of a limited preemp-
tion of trade secret protection of those patentable secrets undiscov-
erable upon marketing was the potential enforcement quagmire that
such a holding would have created." Federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over interpretation of the patent laws, and also have
exclusive jurisdiction over Patent Office decisions attacked in in-
fringement suits. 74
 Thus, state courts are presumably inexperienced
in questions of patentability75
 and would be less capable of making
the preliminary determination necessary to decide whether trade
secret protection should be available. Furthermore, if a distinction
were drawn between secrets readily discoverable upon marketing
and those unlikely to be discovered, the state court would be con-
fronted with an added scientific determination. 76
In Lear, the Court was faced with similar enforcement prob-
lems. There, the Court recognized that in order to implement the
decision that the payment of royalties after a patent grant was
dependent on the validity of the patent, the court deciding enforce-
ability, often a state court, initially would have to resolve the
question of patentability." The Lear Court refused to discard the
traditional interpretation of the clause which grants exclusive juris-
diction to federal courts as still preserving state court jurisdiction
7° 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
71 Id. at 257.
72 See note 32 supra.
73 Chief Justice Burger did allude to enforcement problems of partial preemption in some
brief dicta. 416 U.S. 492.
74 Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 65.3, 675 (1969).
75 28 U.S.C. 4 1338 (1970).
76 The scientific determination would probably be no more difficult than the decision
which the courts are now required to make relative to the status of the prior art. In such
questions, as with most determinations involving patents, the courts are forced to rely on the
expertise and on the persuasiveness of the opposing counsel. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
77 395 U.S. at 675.
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over questions of state law involving patented items." Instead it
viewed the state courts as capable of determining patentability. 79
The Kewanee Court noted the key distinction between Lear and
Kewanee enforcement problems: the state court in Lear possessed a
Patent Office decision to review, while in Kewanee (if partial
preemption was applied) the state court would need to make the
determination of patentability in the first instance. 80 No prior expert
review of a patent application would be available to aid the state
court in consideration of patentability questions." Thus, a question
which an experienced judge normally has some difficulty under-
standing with the aid of expert analysis below would be placed
before the inexperienced state jurist without the disinterested assis-
tance of the Patent Office decision.
In many ways, Kewanee presented the strongest possible case
for preemption. Trade secret law provided protection nearly as
broad in scope, and possibly longer in duration, than that provided
by a patent. The disincentive to seek a patent would seem to have
been powerful. Indeed, there is evidence that the decision not to
seek a patent was the product of a well-calculated consideration of
the available protections. 82 Thus, Kewanee would seem to stand for
the principle that the entire body of state law known as trade secret
protection can stand consistently with patent policy.
The Court's failure to find at least limited preemption of state
protection of patentable trade secrets seems a diversion from the
Lear
-Sears-Compco line of cases prohibiting state use of contract
principles to provide protection eliminating the need to seek a pat-
ent. The body of preemption law developed by those cases would
seem to require a far more penetrating analysis of the relationship
between trade secret and patent law than that exhibited by the
Kewanee Court. The policy favoring free competition in patentable
inventions not submitted to the rigors and public safeguards of the
patent system, as articulated by the Court in Sears, Compco, and
Lear, warranted more serious consideration than that given by the
Kewanee Court.
Nevertheless, Kewanee may be viewed as a pragmatic decision,
despite the tenuous nature of the Court's rationale. Despite the clear
conflict between state and federal policies, there would be little
public benefit from the application of the doctrine of preemption.
Acquisition of patent protection is expensive, uncertain, and too
narrow to serve fully the public interest in encouraging research and
78
 Id. For the traditional interpretation, see Patterson v. Kentucky, 97, U.S. 501, 508
(1878).
79 395 U.S. at 675.
" 416 U.S. at 492.
ai Id.
52
 Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Certiorari at 8, n.10, reprinted in Law
Reprints, supra note 50, at 19.
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development. It should be supplemented by some system of state
protection of technological advances.
It is at least arguable that a public interest in technology should
not be sacrificed for a public interest in competition simply because
one is implemented by state law while the other is a policy implicitly
underlying federal law. Thus, Kewanee is as consistent with sound
economic policy as it is inconsistent with broad concepts of
federalism. An alternative would be to disallow trade secret protec-
tion entirely, eliminating the problems caused by partial preemp-
tion. Such a course was clearly too drastic for the Kewanee Court,
both in terms of precedents' and economic consequences." The
refusal to apply preemption on the grounds that conflict between
trade secret and patent law is de minimis appears difficult to
dispute in terms of policy. In terms of the path which previous
Courts had set, however, Kewanee seems a diversion, if not an
outright anomaly.
W. THOMAS HAYNES
Labor Law—Union Security Provisions and First Amendment
Rights—Buckley v. American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists.'—The American Federation of Television and Radio Artists
(AFTRA)2
 appealed from a declaratory judgment issued by a federal
district court3
 exempting broadcasting commentators 4 William
F. Buckley, Jr. and M. Stanton Evans from formal membership,
dues payments, and other incidents of membership in the appellant
union. Appellees Buckley and Evans are nationally recognized jour-
nalists, authors, and "exponents" of "conservative" political
philosophy. 5
 Mr. Buckley is host and commentator on the serious
83
 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), would seem to preclude preemption of
unpatentable trade secret protection. See note 32 supra.
84
 Undoubtedly preemption of trade secret protection would result in some loss to
industries which have relied on trade secret protection and neglected to seek patents within
the first year of public use of their inventions. The economic benefits to the consumer of
opened competition in such secrets could well be overridden by the increased costs caused by
increased security precautions and employee salaries. As such, it is difficult to see how anyone
would benefit in either the short or the long run from either partial or full preemption. The
relative costliness of patent to trade secret protection would also act to destroy any consumer
benefits from free competition in all patentable but unpatented trade secrets.
' 496 F.2d 305, 86 L.R.R.M. 2103 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3355 (U.S.
Dec. 24, 1974).
2
 AFTRA is a "labor organization" as defined by the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970); it is the collective bargaining agent for most employees in radio and
television broadcasting.
3
 Evans v. American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, 354 F. Supp. 823, 82
L.R.R.M. 2289 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
4
 The district court defined a commentator as a person hired to express his own sincere
opinion and analysis from his viewpoint or bias. Id. at 842, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2301-02.
5
 496 F.2d at 308, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2104.
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